





no 1101 / october 2009
FiScal variableS  
and bond SPreadS




by Christane Nickel, 
Philipp C. Rother
and Jan C. RülkeWORKING PAPER SERIES
NO 1101 / OCTOBER 2009
This paper can be downloaded without charge from
http://www.ecb.europa.eu or from the Social Science Research Network
electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1484626.
In 2009 all ECB 
publications 
feature a motif 
taken from the 
€200 banknote.
FISCAL VARIABLES AND BOND 
SPREADS – EVIDENCE FROM 
EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
AND TURKEY 1
by Christane Nickel, Philipp C. Rother  2 
and Jan C. Rülke 3
1   We are grateful to Jürgen von Hagen, seminar participants at the ECB and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Any 
remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect those of the European Central Bank or the Eurosystem.
2   European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany; 
e-mail: christiane.nickel@ecb.europa.eu; philipp.rother@ecb.europa.eu
3   WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management, Burgplatz 2, 
D-56179 Vallendar, Germany; e-mail: jan-c.ruelke@whu.edu © European Central Bank, 2009
Address 
Kaiserstrasse 29 
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany 
Postal address 
Postfach 16 03 19 
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany 
Telephone 




+49 69 1344 6000 
All rights reserved. 
Any reproduction, publication and 
reprint in the form of a different 
publication, whether printed or 
produced electronically, in whole or in 
part, is permitted only with the explicit 
written authorisation of the ECB or the 
author(s). 
The views expressed in this paper do not 
necessarily reﬂ  ect those of the European 
Central Bank.
The statement of purpose for the ECB 
Working Paper Series is available from 





Working Paper Series No 1101
October 2009
Abstract  4
Non-technical summary  5
1 Introduction  7
2 Literature  survey  10
3 The  data  12
4  The econometric model  18
5 Results  25
6 Robustness  checks  32
7 Conclusions  36
References  38
Appendix  41




We investigate the impact of fiscal variables on bond yield spreads relative to US 
Treasury bonds in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Turkey from 
May 1998 to December 2007. To account for the importance of market expectations 
we use projected values for fiscal and macroeconomic variables generated from 
Consensus Economics Forecasts. Moreover, we compare results from panel 
regressions with those from country (seemingly unrelated regression) estimates, and 
conduct analogous regressions for a control group of Latin American countries. We 
find that the role of the individual explanatory variables, including the importance of 
fiscal variables, varies across countries. 
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Non-technical Summary
This paper assess empirically the link between expected ﬁscal deﬁcits
and bond spreads. It contributes to the literature in the following three
directions. First, with regard to the country sample, it looks at ﬁve
European countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia and
Turkey) that have developed rapidly over the past decade. With varying
pace, they are being integrated in the world economy and international
ﬁnancial markets. Moreover, in absolute terms (Russia) or compared to
their neighbours they are large issuers of sovereign debt. As such, the
status of these economies is ambiguous. By some indicators, they may still
carry the characteristics of emerging economies whereas other indicators,
notably with a forward-looking perspective, may suggest their classiﬁcation
as developed economies. From this angle it is interesting to see how the
relationship between ﬁscal and ﬁnancial market variables for these speciﬁc
countries compares to the broad ﬁndings in the literature for emerging and
developed economies. As a control group, we carry out the same regressions
for the most important government bond issuers in Latin America, namely
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela.
Second, to check for the robustness of the results regarding the ﬁscal link to
bond spreads, we employ panel estimations for the group of countries as well
as country-speciﬁc (seemingly unrelated) regressions. From the literature
on developed economies, there appears to be a tendency towards ﬁnding
signiﬁcant eﬀects of ﬁscal variables on bond spreads when panel estimations
are used. However, tests regarding the assumption on equal slope coeﬃcients
are generally not reported and approaches using country-speciﬁc equations
appear to ﬁnd less evidence of a direct link from ﬁscal to ﬁnancial market
variables.
Third, given that the bond spreads investigated reﬂect market assessments
of the projected riskiness of investments in government bonds, capturing
market expectations is essential. In line with a nascent strand of the6
ECB
literature, we therefore include projected ﬁscal and macroeconomic variables
as explanatory factors in our models. We derive the expected values by
converting the Consensus Economics Forecast data for the current and next
year’s outcome into one year ahead projections.
Our major ﬁndings are as follows. While the panel estimations point
to a strongly signiﬁcant impact of the ﬁscal deﬁcit ratio on bond yield
spreads for the group of countries as a whole, the country regressions show
a diﬀerent picture: only for Hungary and Russia we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
impact of the deﬁcit ratio on the bond yield spread. We ﬁnd robust
panel estimates that if the expected deﬁcit increases by one percentage
point, the bond yield spread increases by 4 percent. The eﬀect for Russia
is even more pronounced since a one percentage point increase of the
expected deﬁcit yields an increase in the bond yield spread of about 13
percent. Hence, there is a signiﬁcant relationship between the deﬁcit
ratio and bond yield spreads. Compared to the analysis of the deﬁcit
ratio, our results for the impact of the government debt ratio are mixed
and we ﬁnd no robust impact. Cross-country diﬀerences appear to be
important also for the other control variables in the regressions as well
as with regard to the result of the control group of Latin American countries.
From a policy perspective, the results suggest that policy makers in emerg-
ing economies need to be prudent in their management of the ﬁscal balances.
In particular, the considerable degree of cross-country diﬀerentiation implies
that there is no unique relationship between the level of ﬁscal imbalances
and the risk premium required by investors. Rather, this relationship varies
across countries and it may change over time. Consequently, levels of imbal-
ances that could appear tolerable by policy makers judging on cross-country
or historical experience may turn out to demand much higher than expected
risk premia in the ﬁnancial market. Speciﬁcally, with a higher level of eco-
nomic development and market integration, ﬁnancial market participants
may become increasingly concerned with the soundness of policy making as
reﬂected in public ﬁnances.
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1 Introduction
The impact of ﬁscal variables on bond yield spreads is receiving growing
attention. Risk premia on government bonds, that had followed a secular
downward trend over the past years, started to increase strongly in 2008.
Diﬀerentiation of yields of developed country bonds increased markedly,
reﬂecting investor perceptions of upcoming macroeconomic and ﬁscal risks.
Spreads on emerging market government bonds also started to reach levels
not seen for many years. This raises the question to what extent domestic
policies, notably ﬁscal policies, and expectations of these can aﬀect the
spreads of emerging market government bonds.
Findings in the literature on the link between ﬁscal variables and government
bond spreads are not entirely clear cut. For developing countries, bond
spreads are generally found to depend to a large extent on perceptions
regarding the economy’s external vulnerability in addition to indicators
reﬂecting the global investment climate. Fiscal variables appear to be less
important. In developed countries, by contrast, ﬁscal variables have been
shown to have an important impact on government bond spreads in some
contributions to the literature. However, the results are not unequivocal
and may depend also on country samples and the chosen methodology.
This paper contributes to the literature in the following three directions.
First, with regard to the country sample, it looks at ﬁve European countries
(the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Turkey) that have
developed rapidly over the past decade. With varying pace, they are
being integrated in the world economy and international ﬁnancial markets.
Moreover, in absolute terms (Russia) or compared to their neighbours (the
other four countries) they are large issuers of sovereign debt. As such, the
status of these economies is ambiguous. By some indicators, they may still8
carry the characteristics of emerging economies whereas other indicators,
notably with a forward-looking perspective, may suggest their classiﬁcation
as developed economies. From this angle it is interesting to see how the
relationship between ﬁscal and ﬁnancial market variables for these speciﬁc
countries compares to the broad ﬁndings in the literature for emerging and
developed economies. As a control group, we carry out the same regressions
for the most important government bond issuers in Latin America, namely
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela.
Second, to check for the robustness of the results regarding the ﬁscal link to
bond spreads, we employ panel estimations for the group of countries as well
as country-speciﬁc (seemingly unrelated) regressions. From the literature
on developed economies, there appears to be a tendency towards ﬁnding
signiﬁcant eﬀects of ﬁscal variables on bond spreads when panel estimations
are used. However, tests regarding the assumption on equal slope coeﬃcients
are generally not reported and approaches using country-speciﬁc equations
appear to ﬁnd less evidence of a direct link from ﬁscal to ﬁnancial market
variables.
Finally, given that the bond spreads investigated in this paper reﬂect
market assessments of the projected riskiness of investments in govern-
ment bonds, capturing market expectations is essential. In line with
a nascent strand of the literature, we therefore include projected ﬁscal
and macroeconomic variables as explanatory factors in our models. We
derive the expected values by converting the Consensus Economics Forecast
data for the current and next year’s outcome into one year ahead projections.
Our major ﬁndings are as follows. While the panel estimations point
to a strongly signiﬁcant impact of the ﬁscal deﬁcit ratio on bond yield
spreads for the group of countries as a whole, the country regressions show
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a diﬀerent picture: only for Hungary and Russia we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
impact of the deﬁcit ratio on the bond yield spread. We ﬁnd robust
panel estimates that if the expected deﬁcit increases by one percentage
point, the bond yield spread increases by 4 percent. The eﬀect for Russia
is even more pronounced since a one percentage point increase of the
expected deﬁcit yields an increase in the bond yield spread of about 13
percent. Hence, there is a signiﬁcant relationship between the deﬁcit
ratio and bond yield spreads. Compared to the analysis of the deﬁcit
ratio, our results for the impact of the government debt ratio are mixed
and we ﬁnd no robust impact. Cross-country diﬀerences appear to be
important also for the other control variables in the regressions as well
as with regard to the result of the control group of Latin American countries.
From a policy perspective, the results suggest that policy makers in emerging
economies need to be prudent in their management of the ﬁscal balance. In
particular, the considerable degree of cross-country diﬀerentiation implies
that there is no unique relationship between the level of ﬁscal imbalances
and the risk premium required by investors. Rather, this relationship
varies across countries and it may change over time. Consequently, levels
of imbalances that could appear tolerable by policy makers judging on
cross-country or historical experience may turn out to demand much higher
than expected risk premia in the ﬁnancial market. Moreover, with a higher
level of economic development and market integration, ﬁnancial market
participants may become increasingly concerned with the soundness of
policy making as reﬂected in public ﬁnances. In this regard, the ﬁnancing
crisis in Hungary in October 2008 teaches an important lesson: high ﬁscal
deﬁcit and debt levels can pose a risk for a country’s ﬁnancial market
access even if the commitment to ﬁscal consolidation is reﬂected in rapidly
improving ﬁscal indicators.10
The next section presents a short survey of the relevant literature. Section
3 discusses the raw data and their transformation, while section 4 lays out
the econometric approach. The following section presents the results and
section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Survey
Findings in the literature on the impact of ﬁscal variables on risk premia
paid by governments diverge according to the level of development and
ﬁnancial market conditions.
For developed countries, a range of papers have found an impact of ﬁscal
variables on risk premia, in particular with regard to the level of public
debt. For the U.S., Goldstein and Woglom (1992) in a seminal paper report
evidence that the debt level of U.S. states has a positive impact on their
bond yield relative to that of other states. Further evidence in this direction
was provided by Bayoumi et al. (1995) and Poterba and Rueben (1999).
Regarding the ﬁscal deﬁcit, Laubach (2009) estimates the eﬀect of the ﬁve
year ahead projection of the U.S. government deﬁcit provided by the OMB
on the level of the ﬁve year ahead real Treasury yield. He ﬁnds that a one
percentage point increase in the projected deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio raises the
level of the real 10-year bond rate by about 25 basis points. However, he
ﬁnds no evidence that yield spreads between corporate and sovereign bonds
(as a proxy for changes in the sovereign risk) are systematically related to
expected ﬁscal balances. Finally, for the OECD countries, Alesina et al.
(1992) analyse the yield diﬀerence between sovereign and corporate bonds
and ﬁnd that it depends positively on the public debt level.
For European and in particular EMU countries several studies tend to point
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towards a signiﬁcant impact of ﬁscal debt and (not quite unambiguously)
deﬁcits for risk spreads across countries. Faini (2006) ﬁnds eﬀects of ﬁscal
deﬁcit and debt levels on the aggregate EMU interest rate level as well
as on country risk spreads in a model with identical slope coeﬃcients
across countries. Bernoth et al. (2004) ﬁnd an eﬀect of deﬁcits and debt
on risk spreads for a pooled estimation of data from 13 EU countries.
Similar results are obtained by Hallerberg and Wolﬀ (2008) using ﬁxed
eﬀects panel estimations. With a similar econometric approach Bernoth
and Wolﬀ (2008) focus on the accuracy of government-reported ﬁscal data
and ﬁnd a spread-reducing impact of ﬁscal transparency in addition to a
positive impact of deﬁcits but not debt. By contrast, public debt is the only
variable included in the explanation of government bond spreads provided
by Codogno et al. (2003) using a SURE approach. Moreover, taking into
account that it is expected developments rather than past outcomes that
whether expected budget deﬁcits derived from Consensus Economics have
an impact on interest rate swap spreads in France, Germany and Italy.
Using a SURE framework, they ﬁnd no such evidence.
The respective empirical literature on sovereign risk spreads for emerging
markets has tended to ﬁnd a much more pronounced eﬀect of economic vari-
ables reﬂecting external vulnerability. With a focus on the central and east-
ern European countries that joined the EU since 2004, Ebner (2009) ﬁnds a
strong inﬂuence of regional ﬁnancial conditions as reﬂected in the ECB ref-
erence rate and market volatility. Using country-speciﬁc regressions, he ﬁnds
that the impact of domestic variables is less clear and there is considerable
variation across countries. In wider studies covering many emerging markets,
the role of domestic policy variables, including those for the ﬁscal sector, is
generally smaller and less signiﬁcant than for developed economies.1 For ex-
1Baldacci et al. (2008) provide a survey of the literature and ﬁnd a stronger result
matter for investment decisions, Heppke-Falk and (2004) analyse H ufner12
ample, in a broad study covering 37 emerging market countries Eichengreen
and Mody (1998) ﬁnd that international interest rates as well as external
debt levels and debt servicing obligation contribute importantly to the de-
termination of sovereign bond spreads. By contrast, ﬁscal deﬁcits have no
signiﬁcant impact. In other studies in this area, ﬁscal balances are not in-
cluded as explanatory variables (e.g. Dailami et al., 2008) or they are not
found to be signiﬁcant (e.g. Ferrucci, 2003, Schardax, 2002, Beck, 2001).
In sum, the existing literature agrees that the eﬀect of ﬁscal variables on
bond spreads substantially diﬀers among countries depending on their level
of development and ﬁnancial market conditions. In particular, studies using
panel econometrics may vary in their results on the role of ﬁscal variables on
bond spreads, depending on the used time frame and the selected countries.
One therefore needs to be cautious when pooling countries and should not
stop at this stage because individual country results may diﬀer substantially
from the pool.
3 The Data
This paper analyzes the behaviour of bond spreads in four Eastern European
countries, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, as well as
Turkey. Since the role for expectations in policy making has been discussed
extensively in the literature (Clarida et al., 1998) and the forward looking be-
haviour of ﬁnancial markets is solidly documented (Heppke-Falk and H¨ ufner,
2004), this paper looks at the impact of ﬁnancial markets expectations on
bond spreads. The focus is the impact of ﬁscal expectations on bond spreads.
To measure expectations, we use survey data published in the Consensus
Economics Forecast poll including projections of professional forecasters
regarding several ﬁnancial and real economy variables, such as short-term in-
terest rates, unemployment rates, the real growth rate and the budget deﬁcit.
regarding ﬁscal deﬁcits when excluding public debt from the regression.
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We use disaggregated monthly survey data provided by Consensus Eco-
nomics Forecasts (CEF) on professional economists’ forecasts for for the
sample period from May 1998 to December 2007. Since the poll is conducted
only six times a year, this covers 59 periods.2 As a benchmark group,
we also analyzed a group of Latin-American countries, namely Argentina,
Brazil, Chile Mexico, and Venezuela. They are similar in economic size and
development compared to the other European countries in our study. The
data set covers the sample period from December 1997 to December 2007,
summing up to 101 periods. While the survey is performed for two diﬀerent
forecast horizons, namely, for the end of the current year (current-year),
and forecasts for the end of the year ahead (year-ahead), we only include
forecasts or the current year in our analysis.3
Using Consensus Economics Forecasts has several advantages over other
surveys. First, the individual forecasts are published together with the
name of the employer of the forecaster.4 This allows to evaluate the
performance of the individual participants and thus should have positive
incentive eﬀect for the accuracy of the forecasts.5 The outlined procedure
2Consensus Economics conducts the survey during the ﬁrst week of each month and
publishes the forecasts at the beginning of the second week of the respective month. Its
participants are professional economists working for universities and ﬁnancial institutions
such as international economic research institutes, investment and commercial banks. The
number of participants varies from country to country with Poland having the highest
number of forecasters (36) while Hungary the lowest (29). Further information on how
the survey is conduct can be found in the website: www.consensuseconomics.com.
3The forecasts provided for the current year exhibit on average a six-month forecast
horizon (average between the twelve-month forecast horizon of January and one-month
horizon of December). Likewise, forecasts for the next year have on average a forecast-
horizon of 18 months.
4The survey participants are professional economists working for universities and ﬁ-
nancial institutions such as international economic research institutes, investment and
commercial banks. A complete list of all participants is available upon request. Note that,
the survey participants are not necessarily engaged in trading in the bond market.
5Batchelor (2001) and Blix et al. (2001) show that Consensus Economics’ forecasts are
less biased and more accurate in terms of mean absolute error and root mean square error14
also prevents a participant to reproduce others’ forecasts limiting, therefore,
the possibility of herding behaviour.6 Moreover, since analysts are bound
in their survey answers by their recommendations to clients, an analyst
may ﬁnd it hard to justify why she gave a recommendation diﬀerent to
the one in the survey. This all is expected to increase the incentives of
the survey participants to submit their best rather than their strategic
forecast (Keane and Runkle, 1990). Second, unlike other surveys, forecasters
participating in the Consensus Economic Forecast poll do not only take
a stance on the direction of the expected change of the macroeconomic
variable. Rather, they also forecast the level of a macroeconomic variable.
Third, compared to other studies dealing with survey data on ﬁscal vari-
ables,7 the CEF poll provides a relatively long time period of nearly ten years.
The time period runs from May 1998 through end-2007. This means,
the data cover the Asian as well as the Russian ﬁnancial crisis which
likely aﬀected investor behaviour towards the countries in this study. The
sample stops before the unfolding of the economic crisis in 2008. Given the
particularly large uncertainty regarding the economic outlook in 2008 and
the considerable volatility in ﬁnancial market variables, it appears likely
that a model estimated on the historical data will not adequately capture
the current events. Thus, the evidence for the overall more quiet past years
would be distorted, while it is still too early to gain evidence from the data
for the current situation.8
compared to OECD’s and IMF’s forecasts. They also show that there is little information
in the OECD’s and IMF’s forecasts that could be used to reduce signiﬁcantly the error in
the private sector’s forecasts. On top of that, Dovern and Weisser (2008) provide evidence
that the participants in the Consensus poll provide rational and unbiased inﬂation and
growth forecasts for the G7 countries.
6For evidence on herding behaviour among market’s participants see Trueman (1994).
7Allers et al. (1998) also use survey data to analyze expectations on ﬁscal variables.
They conduct a survey in the Netherlands with newspaper readers on their knowledge of
government indebtedness and behaviour in response to the ﬁscal policy stance. They ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant evidence of Ricardian Equivalence on their sample.
8Though the sample only runs until December 2007, our results are robust for other
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Regarding global developments, the sample covers a period of a strong
trend decline in the global emerging market risk spread as measured by
the EMBI (Emerging Market Bond Index). Figure 1 shows that the index
declined from a value of about 1400 basis points at the height of the Asian
crisis to around 200 basis points at the end of the sample period with some
increased volatility in 2002 and 2003. This reﬂects the composite impact
of two developments, namely a decline in the perceived risk of emerging
country investments and a decline in the price that investors required for
assuming such risk. The former reﬂects the impact of economic reforms after
the Asian crisis and the better understanding of possible risks in emerging
economies. The latter reﬂects to a large extent the very low interest rates
in developed countries leading to a ‘hunt for yields’ and a decline in returns
for assuming additional risk.















The decline in perceived risk is also reﬂected in the assessment of the
sample periods. For instance, analyzing the period after the euro introduction yield qual-
itatively similar results which are available upon request.16
countries in our sample. Figures 2 and 3 show the average country ratings
from the major three rating agencies for the countries in this study. The
value on the y-axis is the numerical equivalent of the country rating that
is provided in letter code by the agencies. In particular, a AAA rating
has the value 16, a AA+ rating the value 15 and so on. Ratings below
B- are assigned the value 1. The average for each country represents the
unweighted mean of the three agency ratings, rounded to the nearest integer.
As can be seen, the average ratings generally improved for the ﬁve countries
in our study; albeit for Russia only after a sharp dip at the start of the
observation period reﬂecting the ﬁnancial crisis at the time. By contrast,
ratings in the control group generally did not improve with the exception of
Mexico which experienced a steady upgrade in the ratings level.
The implication of these developments for relationship between ﬁscal
variables and sovereign bond spreads is ambiguous. On the one hand,
the hunt for yields could imply that the speciﬁc determinants of country
risk were analyzed less extensively and thus reactions to changes in these
determinants were more muted. On the other hand, with low overall yield
levels, cross-country diﬀerentiation could become more important for the
performance of investments and induce investors to shift investments more
rapidly.
For the ﬁve countries of interest the Consensus Economics data are available
on a bimonthly basis for the period from May 1998 to May 2007 and on a
monthly basis thereafter and, hence, includes 60 periods. For the control
group of ﬁve Latin-American countries the survey provides monthly data
for the period from December 1997 to December 2007, hence our analysis
covers 130 periods. The survey provides CPI, real GDP and budget balance
(but not public debt) forecasts for the current and next year. In order to
equalise the forecast horizon, we generate a synthetic forecast by weighting
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the forecast with the remaining months at the time of the forecast, similar
to the approach in the literature9, and come up with a constant one year
ahead forecast horizon (see the Appendix for details).
Table 1 presents a summary comparison between projected values and actual
outcomes for GDP growth, CPI and the budget balance (in % of GDP) for
the ﬁve countries of interest. Note that the deﬁnition of the budget bal-
9See Heppke-Falk and H¨ ufner (2004) and Beck (2001). A constant forecast horizon is
crucial since the forecast performance improves with a shortening of the forecast horizon.18
ance varies across countries. For Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic,
Consensus Economic requests to predict the General Government Budget
Balance (according to the ESA95 deﬁnition). For Russia the projections
reﬂect the Federal Government Budget Balance excluding privatization (as
deﬁned by the IMF), while for Turkey the forecasts are on the Consolidated
Public Sector Budget Balance including privatization. Table 1 also shows
that the expectations on the macroeconomic variables are on average a good
predictor of their actual value. For instance, the average GDP growth fore-
cast for Hungary (3.9%) and the Czech Republic (3.4%) are close to the
actual outcomes of 3.8% and 3.3%, respectively. However, Table 1 does not
provide evidence that the forecasts published in the CEF poll are accurate
forecasts which is found in other studies (Batchelor, 2001, Blix et al., 2001,
Dovern and Weisser, 2008).
Table 1: Overview of the average forecasts and actual values for the European
emerging economies (1998 – 2007)
Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Russia Turkey
Period 1998 – 2007 1998 – 2007 1998 – 2007 1998 – 2007 1998 – 200
GDP Growth
Forecast 3.4 3.9 4.3 4.2 4.2
Actual 3.3 3.8 4.1 4.1 4.0
CPI
Forecast 3.6 6.3 4.4 18.2 30.0
Actual 3.7 6.8 3.9 18.6 31.5
Budget General Gov. General Gov. General Gov. Federal Gov. Consolidate
Balance in Budget Balance Budget Balance Budget Balance Budget Balance Public Secto
% of GDP (ESA95) (ESA95) (ESA95) (IMF deﬁnition) Budget Balan
Forecast 3.9 4.6 3.5 -0.9 7.6
Actual 4.1 4.8 3.9 -1.2 7.9
Notes: Table 1 shows the expected and the actual variables over the sample period 1998 – 2007. The line
‘Budget Balance’ describes the deﬁnition on the published variable in the Consensus Forecast poll.
4 The Econometric Model
There are basically two possibilities to abstract from exchange rate risk that
arises in the comparison of bonds issued by national governments in their
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national currency. Alesina et. al. (1992), Flandreau et. al (1998), Lemmen
and Goodhart (1999) and Afonso and Strauch (2007) compare the returns on
government debt and private debt of corresponding maturity denominated
in the same currency, thus, analyzing the eﬀect of governmental debt on
the relative costs of borrowing compared to the private sector. However,
it is not clear that the credit risk of private ﬁrms is independent from the
credit risk of their national governments since governments in ﬁnancial
crisis might seize private assets or raise taxes and thus, worsen the borrower
quality of private ﬁrms. Therefore, this study focuses on government bonds
denominated in foreign currency.
Our dependent variable is the monthly average10 country-speciﬁc EMBI
yield spread for bonds denominated in U.S. dollar.11 The yield spreads are
calculated from the daily Bloomberg data as the absolute diﬀerence between
the respective bond yield and roughly comparable interest rates on U.S.
instruments, notably U.S. treasuries.
Regarding the explanatory variables, our interest is in the performance of
the ﬁscal variables, i.e. ﬁscal balances and public debt. However, regressions
using the public debt variable did not lead to robust results. Similar to
Bernoth and Wolﬀ (2008), we see this as evidence that with relatively short
time series and a relatively low degree of variation in the debt variable, the
major eﬀect of debt levels on risk spreads may be taken up by the country
constants. Moreover, as explained above, Consensus Forecast does not
provide debt projections so that we used actual values. From an investor
perspective, the dominance of the ﬁscal deﬁcit over the public debt variables
seems intuitive. The ﬁscal deﬁcit is the key variable in the policy making
10As we refer to the medium-term analysis this averaging should diminish disturbances
arising from potential market overreactions due to short-lived political news.
11We use U.S. dollar denominated bonds since data on euro denominated bonds is not
available for the full sample period.20
process and thus signals the government’s intentions which are key to the
perceived sovereign risk. Moreover, changes in the debt to GDP ratio are to a
large extent (but by no means fully) driven by the deﬁcit as well as real GDP
growth and price level changes, which are captured in the regressions below.12
Thus, our main variable of interest is the ﬁscal balance. In particular, we
include the ﬁscal deﬁcit relative to GDP in our analysis of interest rate
determination. To operationalise our focus on the forward-looking behaviour
of investors, we include expected ﬁscal variables in our regression model.
The expected ﬁscal deﬁcit is published bimonthly in the Consensus Forecast
and provides the deﬁcit of the respective country relative to GDP for the
current and following year. In our regression analysis we use the arithmetic
mean of the projections across the individual forecasters.13 An increasing
budget deﬁcit is expected to have an increasing eﬀect on a country’s credit
risk. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between expected ﬁscal deﬁcits
and bonds spreads.
Figures 4 to 8 show the relationship between the expected deﬁcit as deﬁned
above and the bond spread for the countries under consideration. While for
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the relationship is characterised
by certain clusters which indicate diﬀerent economic situations in the
countries, in the case of Russia and Turkey the positive relationship between
expected ﬁscal deﬁcits and bond spreads is most apparent.
Our set of control variables includes the variables conventionally associated
with the behaviour of sovereign creditworthiness and bond spreads. Con-
cerning the domestic macroeconomic situation of the individual countries,
12According to standard test shown in the Appendix all variables are panel stationar.
13The results do not change qualitatively if we take the median or modus into consid-
eration. Results are available upon request.
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we include expected GDP growth and expected inﬂation. The expected
values are generated in the same way as the ﬁscal variable. Expected real
GDP growth should have a reducing impact on bond spreads as expected
higher growth increases the pool of resources that the government can draw
on to service its debt. The impact of expected inﬂation reﬂects two opposing
eﬀects. On the one hand, higher inﬂation rates raise the tax base for the
government and reduce the real value of outstanding debt denominated in
domestic currency. This should overall relax the government’s ﬁnancing
constraints and result in a reduction of bond spreads also on the foreign
currency borrowing. On the other hand, higher expected inﬂation rates, in
particular if in excess of certain thresholds, are associated with increased
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macroeconomic instability and would thus likely be harmful to a govern-
ment’s creditworthiness.
Turning to variables related to the external dimension, we include the
ratio of countries’ foreign currency reserves over imports as well as their
external debt over exports. Both variables measure a country’s vulnerability
to changes in the external environment. In particular, the reserves ratio
reﬂects the fraction (or multiple) of annual imports that could be paid from
reserves if no further foreign reserves were accumulated and in the absence
of other demands on reserves (such as for interest on foreign currency
bonds). While it is a fairly stylised measure, in particular for countries with
ﬂexible exchange rate arrangements, the reserves ratio has been shown to
have explanatory power with regard to countries’ external vulnerability.
Similarly, the external debt over exports ratio reﬂects how many years
of export earnings would be needed to cover the outstanding external
obligations. Similar to the reserves ratio, this stylised measure has also
been shown to possess explanatory power for countries’ external vulnerability.
In addition to the variables capturing the external environment, global
investors attitudes to country risk are likely to play an important role for
the determination of country bond spreads. Consequently, we include the
EMBI (Emerging Market Bond Index) spread in the regression. This spread,
computed by J.P. Morgan, reﬂects the premium that a portfolio of global
emerging market sovereign bonds is carrying over U.S. bonds.
Finally, we include an EU dummy variable which takes the value one for
countries once they have joined the European Union and zero otherwise. In
particular, being a member of European Union is assumed to contribute to
a country’s creditworthiness as membership requires adherence to a certain
set of rules which foster the ﬂexible operation of markets as well as prudent24
ﬁscal policies.
From the above, our empirical set-up is based on a seemingly-unrelated re-
gression estimation (SURE) and is based on the equation (1):
where i denotes the country index, t is the time index and   is the idiosyn-
cratic error term. Furthermore,
ln(BSt,i) is the log of the bond spread of country i, i.e. diﬀerence the
bond yield of country i and the comparable U.S. interest rate
Et,i[Def] is the arithmetic mean of the expected ﬁscal deﬁcit in terms
of GDP of country i at time t.
Et,i[GDP] is the arithmetic mean of the expected real GDP growth of
country i at time t.
Et,i[CPI] is the arithmetic mean of the expected inﬂation rate of coun-
try i at time t.
EUt,i reﬂects a dummy taking the value of one after the respective
country entered the European Union and is zero otherwise.14
EMBIt,i is the emerging market bonds spread in basis points.
Res
Impt,i is the international reserves in months of imports of goods and
services.
Debt
Exp t,i is the external debt15 in terms of exports of goods and services.
14However, considering the time period before and after the decision on the EU mem-
bership does not change our results qualitatively. The results are available upon request.
15For a deﬁnition of external we refer to WEO (2003).
ln(BSt;i) = i + 1;iln(BSt 1;i) + 2;iEt;i[Def] + 3;iEt;i[GDP] (1)
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5 Results
We start our investigation with a panel of eastern European countries plus
Turkey. Given that we specify a dynamic regression equation, the use of
panel estimators needs to take account of the potential bias induced by the
lagged endogenous variable. While the bias diminishes for samples that
are large in the time dimension, it may be sizeable for shorter samples.16
As a consequence, we present in Table 2 conventional OLS estimates and
provide as a robustness check the results from the Arellano Bond estimator.
The panel is estimated as a random eﬀects model because the ﬁxed eﬀect
speciﬁcation is rejected by the Hausman test. Time dummies account for
common shocks aﬀecting all countries in the sample. Models I to III are
distinguished by diﬀerent sets of explanatory variables. In particular, it is
interesting to check to what extent the domestic macroeconomic variables
and the variables reﬂecting external vulnerability aﬀect the regression results
individually. Therefore, we re-estimate the equation excluding in turns
the respective variables. In other words, model II excludes the external
variables from the regression model, while model III excludes the domestic
macroeconomic variables. Model IV employs the Arellano Bond estimator.
The panel regressions show the expected signiﬁcant positive impact of pro-
jected ﬁscal deﬁcits on government bond spreads (p-values in parentheses).
The eﬀect is stable in size and signiﬁcant across the alternative model spec-
iﬁcations. Moreover, in addition to the constant and the lagged endogenous
variable, the EU accession dummy turns out with a signiﬁcantly negative
parameter, indicating that EU membership indeed has a diminishing impact
on bond spreads, all else equal. The results for the EMBI spread point to
a clear impact of the global investment climate on the bond spreads in the
sample. A higher risk premium at the global emerging market level entails a
16See Judson and Owen (1999).26
higher risk premium for eastern Europe. Results regarding expected inﬂation
and GDP growth are less conclusive. While both variables come out with
the expected sign in the alternative speciﬁcations, expected GDP growth has
a signiﬁcantly negative impact on bond spreads only if external vulnerability
variables are excluded (model II). Of the external variables, the reserves
to import ratio is found to have a consistently negative impact on bond
spreads in all speciﬁcations, whereas the external debt over exports ratio is
never signiﬁcant. Finally, the results from the Arellano Bond estimator are
very close to those of the OLS speciﬁcation (model I), suggesting that the
bias due to the lagged endogenous variable is limited.
Table 2: Panel regression with time ﬁxed-eﬀects (July 1998 – December 2007)
Speciﬁcation I II III IV
Method Random Random Random Arellano
Eﬀects Eﬀects Eﬀects Bond
Constant 1.429*** 1.272*** 1.120*** .004
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.30)
Spreadt−1 .679*** .678*** .746*** .679***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Exp. Deﬁcit .036** .040*** .037*** .035**
(.01) (.01) (.00) (.02)
EU accession -.203** -.198** -.149* -.203**
(.02) (.03) (.08) (.04)
Exp. CPI .001 – .001 .001
(.85) (–) (.75) (.83)
Exp. GDP Growth -.015 – -.033** -.016
(.31) (–) (.02) (.31)
Emer. Market Bond Spread .058*** .061*** .057*** .074***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Reserve/Imports -.007*** -.008*** – -.007***
(.00) (.00) (–) (.00)
Debt/Exports .001 -.000 – .001
(.58) (.53) (–) (.57)
R2 (within) .92 .92 .92 Wald Chi 2 =
R2 (between) .91 .90 .98 980.01
R2 (overall) .90 .89 .94
Hausman Test .99 .92 .99
Time eﬀects .00 .00 .00 .00
Observations 295 295 295 290
Groups 5 5 5 5
Notes: p-values in parentheses; p-values are based on robust standard errors; following the Hausman test
we use the random-eﬀects estimator; ‘Time eﬀects’ indicate the signiﬁcance value under null hypothesis
that all time dummies are equal; *** (**) and * indicate signiﬁcance at the one (ﬁve) and ten percent
level, respectively.
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The panel estimation rests on the assumption of homogeneous slope
coeﬃcients across countries. If this assumption is not fulﬁlled, the results
that emerge from the panel regression may be driven by the behaviour of
individual countries in the sample and not apply to all of them. To account
for this, we estimate separate regressions for each individual country. At
the same time the regional proximity of the countries in the sample may
inﬂuence investor attitudes towards them in the sense that developments
in one country aﬀect the equilibrium outcomes in another county in the
region. Therefore, we estimate the country regressions in a SURE setting.
Technically, we use a GLS estimator instead of OLS since our analysis
includes diﬀerent variables (e.g. the dummy EU) that do not apply for all
Similar to the panel results, we estimate the country speciﬁc regressions
with time ﬁxed eﬀects and in three diﬀerent models using alternative sets
of explanatory variables. While model I as our baseline model includes
all explanatory variables, II (model III) provide robustness test
excluding expected inﬂation and expected growth (Reserves
Imports and Debt
Exports).
Tables 3 to 7 display the results of the analysis for each country sepa-
rately. Table 3 shows the results for the Czech Republic and conﬁrms that
heterogeneity among the countries is relevant. In particular, the expected
deﬁcit variable is not signiﬁcant for explaining variations in the Czech bond
spread and it even carries the wrong (negative) sign. Of the other variables
that were found signiﬁcant in the panel approach, the EU dummy remains
negative and signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, whereas the coeﬃcient on the
EMBI spread remains positive but is only just signiﬁcant in model I and
loses signiﬁcance in the other speciﬁcations. Also the other variables do not
add signiﬁcantly to the explanation of the bond spread behaviour.
model
variables (Heppke-Falk and  (2004).  H ufner28
Table 3: SURE regression, Czech Republic (July 1998 – December 2007)
Speciﬁcation I II III
Constant 3.866*** 3.857*** 3.461***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Spreadt−1 .192 .205 .200
(.32) (.28) (.30)
Exp. Deﬁcit -.078 -.051 -.035
(.31) (.39) (.53)
EU accession -.448* -.512* -.595**
(.16) (.10) (.03)
Exp. CPI -.020 – .002
(.45) (–) (.94)
Exp. GDP Growth .047 – .045
(.33) (–) (.39)
Emer. Market Bond Spread .043* .021 .038
(.10) (.24) (.14)
Reserve/Imports -.015 -.009 –
(.42) (.63) (–)
Debt/Exports -.003 -.002 –
(.34) (.52) (–)
Time eﬀects .00 .00 .00
Model Fit Adj. R2 = .73 Adj. R2 = .74 Adj. R2 = .74
Observations 59 59 59
Notes: p-values in parentheses; p-values are based on robust standard errors; ‘Time eﬀects’ indicate
the signiﬁcance value under null hypothesis that all time dummies are equal; *** (**) and * indicate
signiﬁcance at the one (ﬁve) and ten percent level, respectively.
Table 4: SURE regression, Hungary (July 1998 – December 2007)
Speciﬁcation I II III
Constant 2.791*** 1.705*** 1.330*
(.00) (.00) (.07)
Spreadt−1 .450*** .487*** .677***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Exp. Deﬁcit .047* .085*** .075**
(.07) (.00) (.02)
EU accession -.838*** -.516*** -.427*
(.00) (.00) (.09)
Exp. CPI -.058** – .000
(.02) (–) (.98)
Exp. GDP Growth -.161** – -.017
(.03) (–) (.78)
Emer. Market Bond Spread -.033 -.014 -.012
(.13) (.49) (.49)
Reserve/Imports .032* .036*** –
(.05) (.00) (–)
Debt/Exports .003** .001 –
(.02) (.27) (–)
Time eﬀects .00 .00 .00
Model Fit Adj. R2 = .78 Adj. R2 = .76 Adj. R2 = .71
Observations 59 59 59
Notes: p-values in parentheses; p-values are based on robust standard errors; ‘Time eﬀects’ indicate
the signiﬁcance value under null hypothesis that all time dummies are equal; *** (**) and * indicate
signiﬁcance at the one (ﬁve) and ten percent level, respectively.
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The Hungarian results (Table 4) diﬀer substantially from those for the Czech
Republic. The expected deﬁcit coeﬃcient comes out positive and signiﬁcant
in all speciﬁcations. The coeﬃcient of about .05 reﬂects that an increase of
the expected budget deﬁcit by one percentage point yields an increase of the
bond yield spread by about 5 percent. The EU dummy carries the expected
negative sign and is signiﬁcant. Similar to the Czech case, the EMBI
spread turns out insigniﬁcant. Regarding the macroeconomic and external
vulnerability variables, the eﬀects of expected growth and the external debt
ratio are as expected, whereas the external reserves ratio comes out with
unexpected signs. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient for the expected inﬂation is
negative indicating that higher inﬂation reduces the bond yield spread. A
possible explanation is, that higher expected inﬂation raises the tax base
for the government and reduces the real value of outstanding debt. This
should overall relax the government’s ﬁnancing constraints and result in a
reduction of bond spreads also on the foreign currency borrowing.
The results for Poland (Table 5) resemble those for the Czech Republic.
The expected deﬁcit variable is not signiﬁcant but the EU dummy is (just)
signiﬁcant. Diﬀerent from the Czech Republic and Hungary, Poland’s bond
spread reacts strongly positively to changes in the EMBI spread while for
the macroeconomic and control variables no signiﬁcant explanatory power
emerges.
The regression for Russia (Table 6), in turn, resembles that for Hungary
with a signiﬁcantly positive impact of the projected deﬁcit on the bond
spread. In fact, the estimated coeﬃcient of about .13 is considerably larger
than in the equation for Hungary, reﬂecting that an increase in the projected
deﬁcit by one percentage point leads to an increase of the bond yield spread
by 13 percent. For Russia, also the EMBI spread has signiﬁcantly positive
explanatory power, again with a higher coeﬃcient than estimated for the30
other countries. The control variables come out as expected except for the
reserves ratio.
Finally, turning to Turkey (Table 7), the regression suggests that only global
investor sentiment as measured by the EMBI spread and the external debt
ratio help to explain the behaviour of bond spreads, while the expected
deﬁcit ratio and the remaining control variables do not come out as
signiﬁcant.
The results from the country regressions highlight that interpretation of
the results from the panel regressions needs to proceed with a fair amount
of caution. While the panel results suggest a clear positive impact of the
projected ﬁscal deﬁcit ratio on the bond spread, this result appears to derive
mainly from the relationships holding in Hungary and Russia. Similarly,
the result regarding the explanatory power of the EMBI spread seems to
be driven to a large extent by the country-speciﬁc situation for Poland,
Russia and Turkey. At the same time, while some of the country-speciﬁc
regressions do not support the ﬁndings from the panel approach they also
do not provide strongly contradictory evidence, either.
From an economic perspective, the diﬀerences across the country regressions
imply that ﬁnancial market participants apply diﬀerent criteria when deter-
mining the price of country-speciﬁc risks. Of the explanatory variables in
our regression equation, the impact of EU accession has the most consistent
impact on bond spread across the three countries that joined the EU. But
even for this variable, the results for Poland are somewhat more tentative.
Projected ﬁscal deﬁcits matter for Hungary and Russia. The only country
whose bond spreads are not related to global investor sentiment as reﬂected
in the EMBI spread is Hungary.
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Table 5: SURE regression, Poland (July 1998 – December 2007)
Speciﬁcation I II III
Constant 1.830* 2.566*** 2.006***
(.10) (.00) (.00)
Spreadt−1 .52*** .478*** .525***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Exp. Deﬁcit .001 -.031 .007
(.97) (.19) (.79)
EU accession -.39 -.348* -.419
(.18) (.06) (.13)
Exp. CPI .01 – -.002
(.72) (–) (.94)
Exp. GDP Growth .044 – .046
(.54) (–) (.44)
Emer. Market Bond Spread .052*** .047*** .043***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Reserve/Imports -.006 -.007 –
(.37) (.25) (–)
Debt/Exports .001 -.000 –
(.72) (.77) (–)
Time eﬀects .00 .00 .00
Model Fit Adj. R2 = .94 Adj. R2 = .94 Adj. R2 = .94
Observations 59 59 59
Notes: p-values in parentheses; p-values are based on robust standard errors; ‘Time eﬀects’ indicate
the signiﬁcance value under null hypothesis that all time dummies are equal; *** (**) and * indicate
signiﬁcance at the one (ﬁve) and ten percent level, respectively.
Table 6: SURE regression, Russia (July 1998 – December 2007)
Speciﬁcation I II III
Constant 2.062*** 2.054*** 2.170***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Spreadt−1 .521*** .505*** .580***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Exp. Deﬁcit .135*** .131*** .067***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
EU accession – – –
(–) (–) (–)
Exp. CPI .003 – .005**
(.20) (–) (.03)
Exp. GDP Growth -.032*** – -.16
(.00) (–) (.39)
Emer. Market Bond Spread .115*** .137*** .072***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Reserve/Imports .011*** .007** –
(.00) (.01) (–)
Debt/Exports .001 .001*** –
(.13) (.00) (–)
Time eﬀects .00 .00 .00
Model Fit Adj. R2 = .99 Adj. R2 = .99 Adj. R2 = .98
Observations 59 59 59
Notes: p-values in parentheses; p-values are based on robust standard errors; ‘Time eﬀects’ indicate
the signiﬁcance value under null hypothesis that all time dummies are equal; *** (**) and * indicate
signiﬁcance at the one (ﬁve) and ten percent level, respectively.32
Table 7: SURE regression, Turkey (July 1998 – December 2007)
Speciﬁcation I II III
Constant 1.40*** 1.683*** 1.721***
(.00) (.00) (.01)
Spreadt−1 .611*** .615*** .675***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Exp. Deﬁcit -.020 -.007 .008
(.25) (.60) (.60)
EU accession – – –
(–) (–) (–)
Exp. CPI .003 – -.001
(.22) (–) (.64)
Exp. GDP Growth .016 – -.011
(.46) (–) (.54)
Emer. Market Bond Spread .059*** .062*** .045***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Reserve/Imports -.006 -.006 –
(.22) (.13) (–)
Debt/Exports .001** .001* –
(.04) (.09) (–)
Time eﬀects .00 .00 .00
Model Fit Adj. R2 = .90 Adj. R2 = .90 Adj. R2 = .89
Observations 59 59 59
Notes: p-values in parentheses; p-values are based on robust standard errors; ‘Time eﬀects’ indicate
the signiﬁcance value under null hypothesis that all time dummies are equal; *** (**) and * indicate
signiﬁcance at the one (ﬁve) and ten percent level, respectively.
6 Robustness checks
The above analysis suggests that investor assessment of what factors are
important for the determination of a country’s risk premium varies across
countries. To check whether this ﬁnding is speciﬁc to the selected European
countries we conduct the analysis for the most important government bond
issuers in Latin America, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and
Venezuela. The choice reﬂects the long history of access to international
ﬁnancial markets by these issuers. Moreover, the varying economic fortunes
of the countries in this second group suggest that considerations of sovereign
riskiness played a dominant role in the determination of bond spreads.
The forecasts for the ﬁve Latin-American countries cover the time period
between December 1997 and December 2007. While before April 2001 the
survey is available on a bimonthly basis, the survey covers monthly data
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afterwards yielding considerably more observations than for the Eastern
European countries.
In the regressions, the impact of the EMBI spread turns out signiﬁcantly
more important for the Latin American countries than for Eastern Europe
(see Tables 8 – 12). The coeﬃcient on the EMBI spread is positive and
strongly signiﬁcant for all countries with the exception of Argentina, where
the default history may be the driving factor behind the decoupling from
global emerging bond market trends. Also in contrast to the selected
European countries, the persistence in the behaviour of the bond spread
appears to be higher in Latin America as evidenced by the generally higher
coeﬃcient on the lagged endogenous variable.
Turning to the macroeconomic and ﬁscal variables, the expected ﬁscal deﬁcit
is found to have a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the bond spread in the
case of Mexico and (more tentatively) Venezuela. For the other countries,
the impact is generally non-signiﬁcant and a reverse relationship is found for
Chile for some speciﬁcations. For the other variables, very little explanatory
power is found in addition to the impact of the lagged endogenous variable
and the EMBI spread. Parameter estimates are mostly non-signiﬁcant and
there are also some signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates where the sign comes
out contrary to our expectations.
The results from this second group of countries lend support to our conclu-
sions in the previous section. The behaviour of bond spreads diﬀers across
countries also in this group of geographically close countries with a to some
extent common economic history. The expected ﬁscal deﬁcit matters for a
particular country (Mexico). In contrast to Eastern Europe, global investor
behaviour is a dominant factor for bond spreads throughout the region.34
Table 8: SURE regression, Argentina (December 1997 – December 2007)
Speciﬁcation I II III
Constant 1.820*** .904 .275**
(.00) (.16) (.02)
Spreadt−1 .860*** .916*** .964***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Exp. Deﬁcit -.008 .029 .007
(.73) (.31) (.77)
Exp. CPI -.003 – -.001
(.35) (–) (.65)
Exp. GDP Growth -.043** – -.013
(.02) (–) (.39)
Emer. Market Bond Spread .008 .022* .007
(.57) (.10) (.62)
Reserve/Imports -.074 -.038 –
(.09) (.23) (–)
Debt/Exports -.118 -.101 –
(.10) (.14) (–)
Time eﬀects .00 .00 .00
Model Fit Adj. R2 = .97 Adj. R2 = .96 Adj. R2 = .96
Observations 101 101 101
Notes: p-values in parentheses; p-values are based on robust standard errors; ‘Time eﬀects’ indicate
the signiﬁcance value under null hypothesis that all time dummies are equal; *** (**) and * indicate
signiﬁcance at the one (ﬁve) and ten percent level, respectively.
Table 9: SURE regression, Brazil (December 1997 – December 2007)
Speciﬁcation I II III
Constant .647* .921*** .328
(.07) (.00) (.26)
Spreadt−1 .871*** .834*** .905***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Exp. Deﬁcit -.051 .016 -.039
(.13) (.51) (.30)
Exp. CPI -.021* – -.016*
(.06) (–) (.09)
Exp. GDP Growth .032 – .029
(.19) (–) (.20)
Emer. Market Bond Spread .027** .043*** .024*
(.04) (.00) (.08)
Reserve/Imports -.018** -.010 –
(.03) (.17) (–)
Debt/Exports -.003 .004 –
(.89) (.83) (–)
Time eﬀects .00 .00 .00
Model Fit Adj. R2 = .97 Adj. R2 = .97 Adj. R2 = .97
Observations 101 101 101
Notes: p-values in parentheses; p-values are based on robust standard errors; ‘Time eﬀects’ indicate
the signiﬁcance value under null hypothesis that all time dummies are equal; *** (**) and * indicate
signiﬁcance at the one (ﬁve) and ten percent level, respectively.
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Table 10: SURE regression, Chile (December 1997 – December 2007)
Speciﬁcation I II III
Constant .198 .301* .121
(.49) (.04) (.67)
Spreadt−1 .901*** .900*** .915***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Exp. Deﬁcit -.018 -.023* -.024***
(.15) (.05) (.00)
Exp. CPI .018 – .009
(.62) (–) (.77)
Exp. GDP Growth .014 – .016
(.49) (–) (.43)
Emer. Market Bond Spread .025** .027** .028**
(.03) (.03) (.01)
Reserve/Imports .002 .003 –
(.74) (.66) (–)
Debt/Exports -.018 -.011 –
(.45) (.60) (–)
Time eﬀects .00 .00 .00
Model Fit Adj. R2 = .95 Adj. R2 = .95 Adj. R2 = .95
Observations 101 101 101
Notes: p-values in parentheses; p-values are based on robust standard errors; ‘Time eﬀects’ indicate
the signiﬁcance value under null hypothesis that all time dummies are equal; *** (**) and * indicate
signiﬁcance at the one (ﬁve) and ten percent level, respectively.
Table 11: SURE regression, Mexico (December 1997 – December 2007)
Speciﬁcation I II III
Constant 2.837*** 2.93*** 2.864***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Spreadt−1 .344*** .370*** .343***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Exp. Deﬁcit .140* .258*** .210**
(.07) (.00) (.01)
Exp. CPI .005 – .006
(.47) (–) (.37)
Exp. GDP Growth .050*** – .046***
(.00) (–) (.00)
Emer. Market Bond Spread .084*** .069*** .079***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Reserve/Imports -.004 -.004 –
(.27) (.24) (–)
Debt/Exports .030 .023 –
(.12) (.22) (–)
Time eﬀects .00 .00 .00
Model Fit Adj. R2 = .97 Adj. R2 = .97 Adj. R2 = .97
Observations 101 101 101
Notes: p-values in parentheses; p-values are based on robust standard errors; ‘Time eﬀects’ indicate
the signiﬁcance value under null hypothesis that all time dummies are equal; *** (**) and * indicate
signiﬁcance at the one (ﬁve) and ten percent level, respectively.36
Table 12: SURE regression, Venezuela (December 1997 – December 2007)
Speciﬁcation I II III
Constant 1.215** 1.011*** 1.226***
(.03) (.06) (.00)
Spreadt−1 .754*** .805*** .758***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Exp. Deﬁcit .015 .026** .018
(.27) (.03) (.18)
Exp. CPI .006* – .004
(.10) (–) (.32)
Exp. GDP Growth -.003 – -.005
(.38) (–) (.14)
Emer. Market Bond Spread .035** .032* .033*
(.04) (.06) (.05)
Reserve/Imports .003 -.005 –
(.73) (.62) (–)
Debt/Exports -.021 .002 –
(.27) (.95) (–)
Time eﬀects .00 .00 .00
Model Fit Adj. R2 = .95 Adj. R2 = .95 Adj. R2 = .95
Observations 101 101 101
Notes: p-values in parentheses; p-values are based on robust standard errors; ‘Time eﬀects’ indicate
the signiﬁcance value under null hypothesis that all time dummies are equal; *** (**) and * indicate
signiﬁcance at the one (ﬁve) and ten percent level, respectively.
7 Conclusions
The results suggest government bond investors assign diﬀerent weights to
macroeconomic and ﬁscal variables across countries in their investment
decisions. This most likely reﬂects the fact that the factors driving sovereign
risks are much wider than the set of variables conventionally employed
in empirical analysis, all the more so for emerging market economies. In
particular, internal and external political risks are likely to play a role. For
policy makers in the respective countries, this puts a premium on prudent
policies. Fiscal imbalances that are tolerated by ﬁnancial markets in some
countries (e.g. Czech Republic, Poland and Turkey) may not be accepted in
other countries (e.g. Hungary and Russia).
Given the diﬀerences in explanatory variables found in the literature that
matter for emerging and developed economies, respectively, it would be
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interesting to investigate the evolution over time of the importance of the
speciﬁc variables. The brevity of the available time series prevents inves-
tigation of a related conjecture here. This could be an area for future analysis.38
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Panel stationarity tests
Variable Exp. Sign Deﬁnition Source LL IPS ADF
Exp. Def + Arithmetic mean of the Consensus -1.8* -2.0* 19.2*
budget deﬁcit forecasts Economics Inc. (.05) (.02) (.02)
for the current year
Exp. Def + Arithmetic mean of the Consensus -2.3* -1.9* 20.2*
budget deﬁcit forecasts Economics Inc. (.01) (.02) (.02)
for the next year
EMBI Datastream 2.3* 4.6* 3.5*
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Exp. GDP Growth - Arithmetic mean of the Consensus -2.4* -0.8 -2.7*
GDP forecasts for Economics Inc. (.00) (.19) (.00)
the current year
Exp. GDP Growth - Arithmetic mean of the Consensus -2.0* -0.4 -0.9*
GDP forecasts for Economics Inc. (.00) (.53) (.18)
the next year
Exp. CPI + Arithmetic mean of the Consensus -1.8* -3.0* -1.7*
CPI forecasts for Economics Inc. (.01) (.00) (.02)
the current year
Exp. CPI + Arithmetic mean of the Consensus -2.5* -4.1* -2.6*
CPI forecasts for Economics Inc. (.00) (.00) (.00)
the next year
Notes: LL refers to the Levin-Lin ρ -statistics; IPS refers to the Im-Pesaran-Shin test (using large sample
adjustment values); ADF refers to the augmented Dickey-Fuller test; * indicates signiﬁcance at the ten
percent level rejecting the null hypothesis that the series are non-stationary; p-values in parentheses.
Appendix: Calculation of the Weighted
Average of Expected Variables
In order to generate a one year ahead forecast the forecasted variable ft at
time t (= 1,2,.., 59 and 101, respectively) is calculate as a weighted arithmetic
average of the forecast for the current year fcur
t and the next year fnext
t . We
weight the forecast ft with the remaining number of months m:
ft =
fcur
t  m + (12   m)  fnext
t
12
with m  12. This procedure is also applied by Heppke-Falk and H ufner
(2004) and Beck (2001). Both studies deal with data of the Consensus Eco-
nomic Forecast poll and construct the arithmetic average as outlined above.42
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